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Abstract 
Around the globe, there are varying types of social safety net instruments used by the 
governments, NGOs, microfinance institutions and private entities. The extent of hardship and 
welfare of the vulnerable and poor households largely depends on the effectiveness and 
adequate coverage of these safety net measures.  Researchers have found in large number of 
instances that these instruments are quite useful and have substantial welfare and anti poverty 
impact on the recipient households. monga is a recurrent case of seasonal deprivation that 
forces a large number of households in the northern region namely – Greater Rangpur, suffer 
from occasional starvation, consumption rationing and induces poor households to sell advance 
labor, crops and assets. The Bangladesh government has been operating a number of social 
safety net programs – cash or in kind - in this part to reduce the vulnerability of households 
during monga pledging a long term solution. The study examines the impact of the social safety 
net programs on the welfare of the poor households during seasonal deprivation –called 
monga, in the five districts of Greater Rangpur namely Lalmonirhat. Nilphamari, Kurigram, 
Gaibandha and Rangpur. The study finds that VGD/VGF has strong positive effect in reducing 
poverty while old age pension has no such contribution. The findings also suggest that highly 
vulnerable groups such as day laborers, beggars are left out from the benefit of social safety net 
programs due to their limited coverage and size. 
 
Key Word: Social Safety Net Program, Seasonal deprivation, Vulnerability, Poverty 
 
JEL Classification:   
 
Section 1: Introduction 
 
The poor households in every part of the world are vulnerable to external and internal shocks 
such as natural disasters, seasonal hardships etc. They generally have low access to credit and 
low income generating activities, and thus lack adequate resource capabilities to sustain their 
livelihood. This very common nature of hardship pushes the low income households to 
deeper dimness of poverty. Their vulnerability to external shocks and almost negligible 
capacity to mitigate those shocks force them to sell their assets or embrace greater 
indebtedness to manage money and food. Therefore, their stability and suitability of 
livelihoods largely depend on the support from the government and non-government 
organizations. Worldwide, governments and non-government organizations employ social 
protection measures that aim to provide the poor households with enough cash support or 
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opportunities for employment and income. These measures finally help the poor households 
to maintain their minimum livelihood, cope with the external or internal shocks and thus 
preserve their own resource capabilities.  
 
Certainly, the severity of this vulnerability of poor households intensifies in the case of any 
natural shocks or any seasonal deprivation. Seasonal deprivation or hardship means 
households suffer from starvation or consumption rationing due to loss of income earning 
opportunities and lack of adequate resource to maintain minimum livelihood in particular 
period of the yea which is recurrent. 
 
In Bangladesh, seasonal food deprivation, commonly known as monga, has been the most 
critical problem in the northern Bangladesh namely Greater Rangpur, Kurigram, Gaibandha, 
Lalmonirhat, Nilphamari, and Rangpur districts. Monga refers to a situation where poverty 
stricken households of the northern Bangladesh have to ration their consumption due to lack 
of income and employment. Monga is a famine like situation that occurs every year in 
varying degrees of intensity during the Bengali calendar months of Ashwin and Kartick 
(September to November).  
 
During monga period in the Greater Rangpur region, households with low income or 
households below the poverty line are severely constrained by access to income due to 
unavailability of wage employment or self employment opportunities that in turn force them 
to go for consumption rationing and even to remain unfed. Even they do not have adequate 
access to microcredit. As a result, as coping mechanism, the poor households are induced to 
sell their standing crops in advance and others are forced to sell their labor. Many sell their 
assets (e.g. land or any income generating asset) and/or borrow money from the 
moneylenders at an exorbitant rate to maintain their minimum livelihood. A study by the 
institute of microfinance (2008) shows that in the monga period, 40 percent of the households 
in the monga affected northern part, migrate internally inside the country for income earning 
opportunities, 20 percent of the households borrow from the informal market and 15 percent 
of the  households are forced to sell their assets to manage food. This seasonal crisis leaves its 
impact on the livelihood and life of the households forcing them to remain unfed or half fed, 
and inducing internal migration in possible cases in search of employment and income. 
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While the poor households apply different coping mechanisms, not that they always can 
successfully fight vulnerability. Therefore this is extremely important to provide external 
supports. In mitigating vulnerability and seasonal deprivation in monga, the Government, 
NGOs and private agencies are providing supports during monga. The government has a 
number of safety net programs. The major supports are the state social safety net programs 
that include both cash and in kind support, designed to meet both long term and short term 
solution.  
 
Section 2: Background and Motivation 
The severe crisis of unemployment in Bangladesh had made it more difficult for the poor 
households to manage income and food, and thus has intensified their vulnerability. In 
Bangladesh, natural disasters are quite regular phenomena that have made the life of poor 
households more challenges in addition to their low access to food and income. This situation 
is largely and very commonly evident in the northern part of Bangladesh – the poorest and 
most vulnerable part of the country. The regions in this northern part face seasonal 
deprivation or hardship that is commonly known as monga, generally occurs between 
September and November period. During this time, the poor households in this part lack 
employment, access to income and thus cannot manage even their three meals a day. 
Therefore, they are forced to sell labor or standing crops in advance to manage food and 
many sell their assets too to maintain minimum livelihood.  
 
 
To reduce the vulnerability of the poor households government has both long term and short 
term social safety net measures. The short term or seasonal state of social safety net programs 
(e.g., FFW, CFW) provide quick and emergency cash or food support to the poor households 
to minimize the impact of natural disasters. And the long term measures (e.g., VGD and 
VGF, VGF) are some continuous programs conducted throughout the year providing both 
cash and food supports to reduce the vulnerability of the poor households. The government 
implements these programs through its different ministries and state divisions. Every year the 
government allocates a percentage of its total budget for these programs. Apart from the 
government, a notable portion of the country’s total safety net support is provided by the 
Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) and private institutions. 
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There are many social safety net programs including old-age allowances, distressed disabled 
persons allowance, widow and distressed women’s allowance, cash and food for works 
programs and student stipend programs. Additionally the Government allocates substantial 
resources each year to natural disaster relief programs. Although systematic evaluations of 
these programs are not much done, available research suggests that cash transfer programs 
have helped to alleviate food and health insecurity, have facilitated increased education 
enrolment among the poor and in some cases have enabled beneficiaries to invest in small-
scale income generating activities. The major safety net programs available in Bangladesh 
can be divided into two broad categories – those that provide cash transfers and those that 
provide food/in-kind transfers. In summary, the major programs are as follows:. 
 
 
Cash transfers 
 
Program Detail Major Objectives 
With work 
RMP (Rural 
Maintenance 
Program) 
Cash transfer public works program 
with major focus on women under 
distress and physically fit for works at 
Taka 43 per day. 
 To provide financial support to the rural 
working age households to reduce 
vulnerability. 
With Training and Schooling Requirement 
PESP (Known as 
Food For Education 
previously) 
Primary Education Stipend Program is 
a conditional cash transfer program. 
Promote primary school enrollments and 
attendance, reduce drop-outs and improve 
quality of education 
FSSAP Female Secondary School Assistance 
Program. 
To promote and encourage continuing 
education for female. 
No Work Requirement 
The Old Age 
Allowance 
Tk. 165 a month for old aged 
households except the municipal area. 
 To provide financial assistance to reduce 
vulnerability of old aged households group 
who are unable to work and do not have 
formal pension scheme access. 
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Transfers in Kind and/or Food 
Program Detail Major Objectives 
With work 
FFW 
Food for Work Program operates in rural 
areas and provided about 75,000,000 hours of 
work in 2003-04. 
To reduce food vulnerability of poor 
household. 
Test Relief 
A food transfer program for those of working 
age 
 To provide financial support to the 
rural working age households to 
reduce vulnerability. 
Other Programs such as CHT Development, etc. 
With Training and Schooling Requirement 
VGD and VGF 
 
Vulnerable Group Development program. It 
also provides training for life-skills and for 
developing skills needed to undertake income 
generation activities. 185 thousand metric tons 
of wheat, 500 thousand beneficiaries with 
largest component about 450 thousand VGD 
and VGF women 
 
 
 
 
 
To develop skills and reduce long 
vulnerability in the long run with 
major focus on women. 
Program Detail Major Objectives 
No Work Requirement 
VGF 
Vulnerable Group Feeding program. . It 
provides food to selected households in the 
months following a disaster when agricultural 
production has been severely disrupted. About 
6 million VGF cards were issued during 1998 
flood. 
 
 
 To reduce food vulnerability at the 
event of disasters and any natural 
calamities. 
Gratuitous Relief 
Emergency relief program for those affected 
by natural disasters. While GR is a relatively 
small program, it is the main way in which the 
Government provides immediate, short-term 
relief to disaster areas. 
 
 
Gratuitous Relief (GR), designed to 
provide emergency relief to disaster 
victim in small scale.  
 
 
Coverage of Social Safety Net Programs in Bangladesh 
 
Bangladesh’s rapid economic growth and social changes have created new social protection 
challenges while old ones remain. New challenges are driven by rapid urbanization and 
breakdown of family system. Much of the existing safety net is rural focused and there is an 
urgent need to address the needs of the urban poor and excluded groups such as the disabled 
and street children. The Government of Bangladesh has given much importance on social 
safety net programs. The government spends less than 1 percent of the GDP, documented at 
around 0.7 percent in 2001 (WB and ADB, 2003) and about 4.4 percent of public expenditure 
in social safety-net programs (MOFBD, 2007-08); far less than the average allocation of 5 
percent of GDP in south Asia and even less that 2 percent of allocation in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(WB’s Assessment of SSNPs in Bangladesh, 2004). 
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Approximately 10 percent of the poor and 5 percent of the ultra poor are covered by any 
SSNP meanwhile 50 percent of eligible old age households are not covered by the pension 
scheme (MFDM and WFP, 2005). There are already 27 varieties of safety-net programs 
being run by the Government in Bangladesh (Hassan, 2007). But the amount given per 
households per year (Table-2) is not much larger and is not expected to have large anti 
poverty impact. 
 
The SSNP coverage has, by and large, increased both in terms of areas (mouzas) and number 
of households. Coverage of the mouzas in the surveyed districts ranges from 38 percent 
(RIMP) to 96 percent (old-age pension scheme) while household coverage varies from 15 
(RIMP) to 271 households (VGD and VGF) per mouza. But still the coverage seems to be 
very low. The average gross amount received by the beneficiaries was Tk.576 and the net 
benefit after deductions of associated costs and system payments stood at Tk 510, about 88 
percent of what was officially received last time before the interview. Although the average 
gross amount received previously was somewhat less than that of the last time. But the net 
receipt of previous installment was about 95 percent of the gross amount, which means lesser 
deductions as banks or other legal charges and system payments (SSNP Survey, 2007). 
Before this survey, inadequacy of coverage became crystal when, for example, the 2000 
HIES data arrived a rough estimate of 75 percent of allocations to the FFE do not reach 
beneficiary HH (Farid, 2003).  Nevertheless, perception of SSNP benefits varies over regions 
and also between the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. But most of the informants 
personally interviewed or otherwise met in FGD or community meetings, expressed views 
that SSNP was an essential support system. 
 
The World Bank reports, “The community survey data thus suggest that about 7.5 percent of 
all rural households participate in the FFE, an estimate that is not too far off from the official 
program estimate of approximately 10 percent coverage. Similarly, the 562,000 beneficiary 
estimate from the HIES community survey for the VGD and VGF is very close to the official 
estimates of 550,000 women covered in each 18-month VGD and VGF cycle.” Of course the 
recent HIES 2005 states (Table-4) that the national coverage at 13.06 percent with 15.64 
percent in the rural and 5.45 percent in the urban areas. 
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World Bank South Asian Human Development Report (2006) shows that safety net programs 
roughly cover below 10 percent of poor individuals and are administered by a large number 
of agencies. While it is difficult to compute the number of beneficiaries of these programs in 
any given year, especially as the disaster relief programs are rolled out and expanded in times 
of natural disasters – in general these programs reach about 4 to 5 million households. Most 
of the programs act as risk-coping instruments implemented by ministries including the 
Ministry of Social Welfare, the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management, the Ministry of 
Women and Children’s Affairs, and, in the case of conditional cash transfers programs in 
education – the Ministry of Primary and Mass Education, and the Ministry of Education. The 
beneficiary level coverage has been shown in Table-5, as The World Bank study (2004) 
estimates: 
 
Expanding the coverage of the social safety nets in Bangladesh is not costless. In fact, it is 
reallocation of financial resources. During the past decade costs of the social safety nets have 
enormously expanded. This quite evident from Table-6 () presented below. 
 
Source: The World Bank Study, 2004 
 The trend that is of concern is 
highlighted in the figure above. The ratio 
of expenditures on safety net programs as 
a percentage of GDP and public 
expenditures has been declining. While 
expenditures on social sectors (this also 
includes spending on other social 
protection programs as well as on 
education and health) have remained 
fairly constant since the mid-1990s – in 
the range of 3.5-4 percent annually, safety 
net expenditures now make up less than 20 percent of all social sector expenditures, down 
from about 30 percent in the late 1990s – indicating crowding out of social assistance. 
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Section 3: Research question 
This paper basically tries to assess how much these programs, provided by the government, 
are effective and how do these programs impact welfare of the livelihood of poor households 
during monga. The study also examines the coverage of these safety net programs and deep 
scale effect on consumption of the poor households in the monga period, and how much these 
programs have been successful in reducing the vulnerability of the poor household in 
seasonal deprivation, that is monga, in the northern region. 
 
Section 4: Literature Review 
 
Social Protection and Social Safety Net Defined 
Social protection as a strategy is recognized globally. Although different agencies and 
scholars have defined social safety net measures in different ways, the basic elements remain 
the same. The UNDP IPC report identifies social protection as an instrument, focusing on 
poverty prevention and reduction providing support to the vulnerable, poor and the poorest, 
finally addressing the causes of poverty, not simply its symptoms. These risk factors impact 
the poor directly, through, lower consumption and asset depletion, and also indirectly through 
behavioral responses with long-term detrimental effects on welfare, productivity and income. 
As Holzmann and Grosh (2008) defines, “Social protection defined as public policies that 
assist individuals, households, and communities in better managing risk and support the 
critically vulnerable is crucial for sustainable and equitable economic growth, contributes in 
fundamental ways to human development, and is essential for poverty reduction.” Another 
almost identical definition says that social protection is the sum of safety nets (social 
assistance) and social insurance (pensions, unemployment insurance) (Weigandand and 
Grosh, 2008). Therefore, through social assistance and insurance programs, social safety new 
ensures a minimum living standard for the poverty stricken people. As ILO (1997) stated, “A 
social safety net ensures that each member of society facing destitution is provided with the 
minimum level of cash income, health and social services needed to lead a socially 
meaningful life”.  
 
Babu (2005) in his study categorizes all these social protection and safety net measures based 
on their objectives - income transfers through cash, food related transfer programs, price 
subsidies, human capital related social safety nets, public works programs, and micro credit 
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and informal insurance programs. The other way an effective ‘social protection package’ can 
be designed including: a core of broad measures to enhance incomes, assets and security and 
increase access to services, and specific measures, such as nutritional support targeted at 
particular groups (CPRC, 2007).  
 
According to the International Labor Organization (ILO), social protection is conceived as 
having four major components, namely, social security systems (statutory employer-related 
benefits), universal social benefit systems (benefits for all), social assistance systems (poverty 
alleviation in cash and in kind for all in special need) and private benefit systems (employer 
related or individual benefits) (ILO 1997: 5-6). Social security protects members of society 
through public measures against economic and social distress, the provision of medical care 
and the provision of subsidies to families with children (ILO 1998a: 8). All these programs 
push help the poor households to build and preserve their own resource and achieve 
sustainability in the long run.  
 
Based on the documented social protection and safety net programs, we can identify the 
following elements: 
 
• Cash transfers or food stamps, whether means tested or categorical as in child 
allowances or social pensions, old age pensions 
• In-kind transfers, with food via school feeding programs or mother/child supplement 
• Programs being the most common, but also of take-home food rations, school supplies 
and uniforms, and so on 
• Price subsidies meant to benefit households, often for food or energy 
• Jobs on labor-intensive public works schemes, sometimes called workfare, 
employment benefits,  
• In-cash or in-kind transfers to poor households, subject to compliance with specific 
conditionalities on education or health, and tax benefit 
• Fee waivers for essential services, health care, schooling, utilities, or transport 
• Human capital specific social safety nets, and public works programs 
• Microfinance, and informal insurance programs such as microinsurance 
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Social protection and safety net programs are much popularly and effectively used in the 
developing and transitional countries. Developed nations are less dependent on the social 
social protection instruments. This is evident from the findings that US, UK, Australia, New 
Zealand, and Canada are less reliant on social insurance instruments (pensions, health, 
unemployment insurance), and have greater use of targeted support to deserving poor, and 
specifically in Continental Europe social protection has played an excellent role (World Bank 
SSNPN, 2002).  
 
Effective social protection is crucial to help persistently poor households and countries 
accumulate assets, increase their capacity to mitigate shocks and hazards, and thus escape 
from poverty. This has been stressed in many studies that social protection must be integrated 
with other anti-poverty measures for the best output; where currently in many countries, 
social protection is a string of discrete programs that are improperly connected to each other 
or to focal anti-poverty policies.   
 
What Safety Net Measures are Available across the Globe? 
 
Historically around the globe, social safety net programs have emerged as one of the major 
weapons to protect and uplift households from the grip of poverty. Different countries 
provide varied typed of social protection measures. Kamerman and Gabel (2006) found that 
most OECD and EU countries provide a number of social protection measures: social 
assistance such as cash benefits with minimum income programs, subsidize the costs of 
housing, cash or tax benefits and services for family, special cash or tax benefits for lone 
parents, advanced cash benefit maintenance or guaranteed child support, employment-related 
benefits, such as minimum wages or tax benefits, maternity or parental benefits and leaves 
from employment, credit towards old age pensions, cash benefits  for child care, child trust 
funds, tax benefits - to supplement on wages etc.  
 
The largest numbers of these SSNs are still in Latin America and the Caribbean, more are 
today in other regions. Emergency social funds, social investment funds, and social action 
programs have been implemented or are being implemented in at least 45 countries, in Latin 
America, Africa, and Asia. Although they are extremely prevalent in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (22 at least), they are also widely present in Africa (16 at least) and increasingly 
common in Asia (6 at least) (Reddy 1998). Thirteen countries in the region have implemented 
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conditional cash transfer programs, in most cases with support from the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB) (Inter-American Development Bank, 2006). Almost half (15) of 
the 36 Latin American/Caribbean region countries have family allowances of some sort in 
place, often income-tested, limited to women working in the formal sector  and provides far 
more extensive child benefits than the Asian and African countries. Indeed, the region with 
the next highest proportion of countries with family allowances, after Europe, is Latin 
America, though the Caribbean countries are far less likely to have such policies (Kamerman 
and Gabel 2006).  
 
Considering border regional view, this is found that the Commonwealth Independent States 
(CIS) countries in general lack proper unemployment benefit schemes (or indeed, means 
tested social assistance schemes) that can act as a reliable safety net for households out of 
work (Klugman, Micklewright and Redmond, 2002). Kamerman and Gabel (2006) in their 
report stated that apart from health care and education, the most significant service included 
in the social protection system in the OECD and EU countries is early childhood education 
and care services. Of course the European systems have both contributory benefits and non-
contributory benefits - contributory benefits are designed to mitigate the risks directly linked 
to labor market events (unemployment, retirement, professional illness and accidents, etc) 
and Noncontributory benefits include a large number of social assistance is only one (such as 
universal child benefits and social pensions) (Neubourg, Castonguay and Keetie Roelen, 
2007). 
 
The Latin American countries, being the center of highest number of safety net and social 
protection programs, introduced a set of highly innovative ,domestically designed poverty 
and vulnerability reduction SSN programs by the mid 1990’s of which the noted programs 
are -  Bolsa Escola/Familia (Brazil), Progresa/Oportunidadesa (Mexico), and Chile 
Solidario (Chile) . These programs have mobilized regional and global interest in social 
protection policies (Barrientos and Hulme, 2008).  
 
In Central America most of the countries also have a good number of social security 
programs that covers the risk of illness, disability, old age, and death. Marques (2003) studied 
the social safety net programs of 5 countries in detail. Marques (2003) identified social 
protection measures including early childhood development, school welfare programs, 
housing subsidies, income support programs, schools vouchers, student transportation and 
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scholarships, micro-credit/disaster management subsidies (land fund, housing, school 
transport, electricity), conditional transfers to families with infants and school age children, 
conditional cash transfer (CCT) program. 
 
Asia, despite having, high number of poor population, doesn’t have much innovative and 
wide scale safety net programs as found the Latin and Central American regions. Targeted 
cash benefits are the major policy instrument supplemented by food programs targeted on 
young and school-aged children and on lactating or pregnant women in Asian countries 
(Kamerman and Gabel, 2006). In 1990s and early 2000s there have been much donor-
financed social protection activities along with government initiatives in Asia, for example 
old age pensions in Bangladesh, India and Nepal and the Samurthi Programme in Sri Lanka 
(Barrientos and Hulme, 2008). India has taken a regional leadership role through its National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) (Barrientos and Hulme, 2008) in 2004 
introducing guarantees employment at least for 100 days a year at the minimum wage to one 
person from every poor household (UNDP IPC, 2006). The NREGS is a social assistance 
program that has targeted to ensure basic income security for vulnerable households in the 
rural areas.  
 
Alongside, India has varying types of safety net programs such as Jawahar Gram Samridhi 
Yojana (JGSY), Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana (SGRY), Universal health insurance 
(Not covered in this paper), Welfare funds, NGO local micro-insurance schemes, mitigate 
risks arising from lean season unemployment or health shocks etc. and School scholarship, 
School grain distribution program, Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS), 
Swarnajayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY) through building human capital, and finally 
For the poor households under chronic poverty, India has large scale Targeted Public 
Distribution System (TPDS), Social assistance schemes, National Old Age Pension (NOAP), 
Disability pension, Widow pension and Maternal benefits (Ajwad, 2007). On the other hand, 
although Asian, in China, social protection and safety net measures are less dependent on the 
state or donor. To increase aggregate and individual contributions from employers and 
employees into social insurance, housing, health services and education accounts publicly 
provided social protection benefits and services are now privatized since 2001 (Barrientos 
and Hulme, 2008).  
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The greater African region, a detail study by Barrientos and Hulme (2008) suggests that the 
status and evolution in and after 1970s social protection in much of the region has been worse 
as almost all measures found are quite short term measures and thus unsustainable, such as 
emergency food aid, famine relief, and humanitarian assistance. They also identified that 
recently in Zambia, Kenya, Malawi, Uganda, Ghana, and Nigeria, social protection programs 
have started to transform into permanent approach, shifting from the short term solutions 
such as cash transfers schemes targeting the poorest and the most vulnerable, including 
human development components. Zimbabwe established and updated a number of 
government-run social safety nets in the early 1980s such as Drought Relief, Child 
Supplementary Feeding and Agricultural Recovery Programs and later during the late 1980s 
(Munro, 2003). 
  
But simply contrary to this abundance of social safety net measures, in Latin and Central 
America, OECD and EU countries, Asia, and Africa, the United States, as an example of the 
developed nations, also shows the availability of cash benefits and services that are of direct 
benefit to individuals and families including programs providing for income maintenance 
through social insurance and public aid, and those providing public support of health, 
education, housing, especially Child Health Insurance Program and cash and non-cash 
government transfer and other State welfare services (Danziger and Danziger, 2005).  
 
The global picture of available safety net measures shows that there are plenty of different 
innovative safety net instruments around the globe which is difficult to be focused only on 
literature. Despite this, there is evidence that, all over the world either underdeveloped or 
developing, in every nation there are safety net measures to reduce the vulnerability of 
households most of which are targeted to the poor households. The developed nations also 
have safety net measures but less reliant on these safety net measures because low rate of 
poverty and high per capita income complimented by strong national economic condition. 
 
Coverage and Impact of Social Safety Net Programs: The Global Experience 
Whatever programs available in the world, the issue of how much coverage in terms of 
geographical outreach or number of beneficiaries, they have been able to attain is crucial. 
Because the success of these programs entirely depends on how many people have been able 
to reduce their vulnerability in realty. Different studies suggest that the coverage of social 
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safety net varies widely and distinctively across region and across the globe. After World 
War II, Social security grew massively in developed countries.  
 
Safety net spending as a percentage of GDP, in most countries centers around 1 to 2 percent 
range (Weigand and Grosh, 2008; Atkinson, 1995). Social Safety Nets have seen large scale 
modernization and innovation in the last decade. The level of resources devoted to recent 
safety net measures by the states also has been found to be quite substantial. In a sample of 
countries, social safety net expenditure was estimated to average 10.3 percent of total public 
social expenditures and 32.6 percent of expenditures on basic social services that strongly 
advocates that these social safety net programs have strong scope to contribute to asset and 
income redistribution and poverty reduction (Reddy, 1998). On the other hand as an example 
of the Central American country, Uruguay spends almost 80 percent of GDP for its safety net 
and social protection programs (The World Bank, 2004). 
 
In developing countries, during the last decade, the rapid introduction and innovation of 
social protection programs based on income transfers has resulted in a steep rise in coverage 
scenario. Studies reveal that these new forms of social assistance introduced in the last 
decade now reach over 150 million poor households in developing countries, covering 
roughly half a billion households as beneficiaries directly or indirectly. (Tambunan, 2003);  
 
Asia is one of the most demanding regions for safety net programs with almost all middle-
income and low-income countries. In Asia, Indonesia has wide range of safety net measures 
reaches maximum 52 percent to minimum 5 percent of the poorest 20 percent households 
while the rate is 40 percent and 5 percent of the poorest 40 percent households, respectively 
(Tambunan, 2003). Another large safety net hub India’s National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Scheme expected to reach 26 million households during 2008. An extensive 
examination on Uttar Pradesh, the largest state in India whose households of almost 170 
million, suggests that in UP,  less than 1 percent of the households benefiting from any of the 
social assistance programs. Even the targeted public distribution system only benefits about 
15 percent of Below Poverty Line (BPL) cardholders with the only exceptions - school grain 
distribution program ( reaching 47 percent) and the school scholarship program ( reaching 27 
percent). In Egypt Program elements generally do not reach the poor as Food subsidies cover 
the majority of the poor (73 percent) but also go to most of the non-poor (72 percent). Only 
11.5 percent of the poor receive government cash transfers, and only 0.6 percent of the 
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households were raised above poverty. The programs are very expensive when subsidies are 
included Core safety net is 2.1 percent of GDP (Blomquist, 2006). 
 
Thus a number of studies conclude that despite abundance of resources allocated to many of 
the social safety net programs, coverage of key risks that affect the poor is inadequate to 
protect them from at least a number of risks categories. Many of these social protection and 
safety net measures are either demand driven or supply driven and the choice between this is 
crucial for a country in designing proper safety net measures. 
 
Not only the coverage, but also notable impact brings success of the safety net programs 
which have high cost of operation. Alongside the expanded, this is also important to ensure 
that these programs have sufficient positive impact in reducing the vulnerability of the poor. 
Typically, these programs top up family or individual income up to a certain threshold set 
nationally or regionally. These last-resort safety nets can have a major impact on both the 
extent and the intensity of financial poverty. At the same time, the conditionality on 
resources, including employment income, reduces any short-term gains of attempts to escape 
poverty by pursuing other income sources (WB SSNPN, 2006). Evidence from OECD 
countries suggests that countries that devote a higher proportion of public expenditure to 
social protection generally have lower levels of chronic poverty (Fourage, D. 2003). 
 
The impact of social safety net globally varies across region and across programs. Globally, 
there is evidence that cash transfer programs, regardless of whether they are child-
conditioned or pensions increase the wellbeing of children in households (Barrientos and 
DeJong, 2004). Other studies (Duflo, 2000; Carvalho, 2000) show that the gender of the 
beneficiary is likely to affect children by gender. The old age pension is the largest program 
in South Africa, and has marginally reduced the number of households living below the 
poverty line; but it has demonstrated more significant positive impacts on children’s health 
and nutrition (Barrientos et al, 2003). The increased availability of publicly provided 
employment on infrastructure projects (self-targeted to poor because of low daily wage rates) 
as a key element of regional development plans could have a significant impact on seasonal 
rural underemployment (Fritzen, 2003). Recent rigorous impact evaluations of Social Safety 
Net programs (cash transfers and workfare) have demonstrated the contribution of SP&L 
interventions to reducing poverty and malnutrition and improving access to health and 
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education services, and the prevalence of such programs is growing (Holzmann and Grosh, 
2008). 
 
The welfare impact assessment of Indonesian social safety net programs show that a 
household which participated in a social safety net program had a per capita consumption 
level which is around 4 to 10 percent higher compared to a similar household which did not 
participate in the program (Sumarto et al, 2004). A household which participated in this 
program has a three percent lower probability to be currently in poverty than a household 
with similar characteristics but did not participate in this program. On the other hand, 
participation in the subsidized credit program has a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient and thus a household which participated in this program has a higher probability 
to be poor than a similar household which did not participate in this program (Sumarto et al, 
2004). 
 
Section 5: Data and Variables Used 
 
The main objective of the study to assess the impact of social safety net programs on seasonal 
deprivation. The variable, therefore, we choose to analyze impact of social safety net 
programs is seasonal deprivation. In the data set seasonal deprivation is defined in terms of 
meals during the previous year, that is, consumption in monga period. Especially, seasonal 
deprivation is defined a one meal in a day in monga period. This is a situation where 
households occasionally are deprived from food. The severity of monga affected households 
is determined by the occasional starvation 
 
The other variables explaining the monga include age, family size, own room as household 
characteristics.  VGD and VGF, old pension are included as social safety net programs. The 
variable “number of working male members over 12 years” is included as an instrumental 
variable for income.  The dummy variables for monthly salaried or service, employment in 
agriculture and non-agriculture, day labor and beggar are taken as explanatory variables. 
Other variables incorporated into the analysis are – owning any agricultural equipment, 
owning fish culture, owning any transport, owning small business, owing any other business, 
presence of Char and presence of NGO.   
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To assess impact of social safety net programs on seasonal deprivation, it is highly 
emphasized to the selection of monga prone area and data collection from these areas. Since 
greater Rangpur is highly affected by the near indigence form monga, data were collected 
from this region. Data collection was covered by the jointly collaboration of Palli Karma-
Sahayak Foundation (PKSF) and Institute of Microfinance (InM).   Five districts of greater 
Rangpur - Gaibandha, Kurigram, Lalmonirhat, Nilphamari, and Rangpur itself were chosen 
and information is collected.   
 
We used PKSF-InM census data. The instruments used to collect the data in this survey are 
Focus Group Discussion (FGD) questionnaire, community questionnaire and household 
questionnaire.  
 
Section 6: Safety Net programs in monga: Coverage and Impact 
 
Compared to the other parts in Bangladesh, the Greater Rangpur region faces the deepest 
dimness of poverty and deprivation during monga period. Households have to sell their 
assets, labor and/or standing crops in advance, to ensure their survival and the scope for 
income generating activities during monga is quite negligible. Consequently, the poor 
households have to largely depend on government supports for their minimum livelihood. 
Government support has been extremely inadequate to guarantee them a second chance. The 
results for main two government social safety net programs – Vulnerable Group 
Development (VGD), Vulnerable Group feeding (VGF) and Old Age Pension, prove this fact 
beyond doubt. 
 
In the Greater Rangpur only about 7 percent of the households are covered under the VGD, 
VGF and old age pension program. Although meager, the programs suffer from equitable 
distribution. Despite being relatively less vulnerable Lalmonirhat has 11.31 percent and 
Rangpur 11.75 percent of households received VGD and VGF cards while in Kurigram 
which is the worst affected part during monga in the Greater Rangpur region, only 1.69 
percent households received the benefit (Table –7). Nilphamari also has very insignificant 
coverage of 1.67 percent while Gaibandha also has thriving with a quite meager 5.84 percent 
coverage of the households the region (Table – 7).  
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This does not imply that Rangpur and Lalmonirhat districts are over emphasized in 
supporting total households under poverty and high vulnerability. The equity question arises 
on the ground of priority. Old age pension scheme as a safety net also fails to provide due 
coverage to the poverty stricken households in Greater Rangpur during monga. Table-8 
shows only 1.21 percent of the households in Kurigram and 1.89 percent of the households in 
Nilphamari received old age pension. Gaibandha and Rangpur have around 3% with another 
substantial low coverage of 1.71 percent in Lalmonirhat. The total status is also not very 
healthy with only 6.29 percent of the households receiving VGD and VGF and 2.05 percent 
of the households receiving old aged pension. A very negligible proportion of households 
(0.21 percent) receive both the benefits (Table – 8). However, recently the present caretaker 
government has introduced Taka 100 crore employment generation scheme. 
 
Despite having limited deepening of the social safety net programs, the placement of the 
programs seem to be determined by household characteristics. Table-9 shows that VGD and 
VGF have positive relationship with the family size. This implies that VGD/VGF are largely 
placed with the households with large family size. They are expected to be more vulnerable. 
Only about 1.5 percent of the households with family member up to 2 hold VGD/VGF card 
compared to some 1.9 percent for the family size 6 and above members. But the relationship 
between old age pension and the family size is negative though families with higher members 
are subject to higher vulnerability during monga. The highest coverage is 2.81 percent of the 
households with family members up to 2 compared to about 5 percent with family size of 6 
and above members. This suggests that VGD/VGD and also age pension schemes have 
different target groups. 
This is true that family size, although has relationship with VG/VGF and old age pension, is 
not the criterion for program placement. But the criteria of vulnerability reflect extreme poor. 
Therefore, land size may be found to have a relationship with VGD/VGF. Indeed, as evident 
from Table-10, landless households have more access to VGD/VGF programs. But no such 
trend is found for old age pension, as age is the criterion for placing pension scheme. 
  
Table-11 shows that percentage of the old age pension beneficiaries increases as age 
increases. It ensures that obviously older headed households have more access to old age 
pensions. Some 0.39 percent of the households with the age of head in between 20 to 30, 
compared to a higher 4.93 percent for age of heads between 50 to 60 and 8.86 percent for age 
range 60 to 70. There is a systematic trend. Contrary to this, there is no such trend available 
 19
for VGD and VGF by age of the household heads. Table-12 presents a more concise picture 
of coverage by profession. Beggars have more access to old age pension (highest 6.54 
percent), and VGD and VGF (highest 2.99 percent) as compared to the occupation in self 
employment in non agriculture. Unfortunately, day laborers, one of the most vulnerable 
groups, have very little access to the old age pension although they have better access to 
VGD and VGF. 
 
To derive a sense of impact, we will try to find out a relationship between access to social 
safety net programs and consumption ordering in Tables–13 and Table-14. A possible impact 
will depend on the program and size deepening. The results indicate the effectiveness of the 
programs in reducing vulnerability and deprivation. At the aggregate level, around 46 percent 
of the beneficiary households compared to a higher 47.30 percent of the non-beneficiary 
households, were on occasional starvation during the last monga. This reduction in the 
occasional starvation strongly suggests of a strong positive impact of the safety net programs. 
In terms of consumption rationing no difference is found. But a clear difference emerges 
when looked at from the perspective of three full meals. Some 9 percent of the beneficiary 
households had three full meals a day compared to a little over 4 percent for the non-
recipients. Perhaps it can be argued that social safety net programs benefit the participants. 
Similar pattern is found at the district level in Gaibandha, Lalmonirhat, and Nilphamari 
(Table-13). 
 
Alongside the effect of VGD and VGF program, the effect of old age pension scheme which 
is another major program works to secure the livelihood of the old age households (Table-
14). In fact, among the monga hit poor, old age households is the worst hit as they do not 
have adequate resources, ability to sell labor and capacity to work. They simply depend on 
the others’ support and contribution. Therefore, the government’s old age pension scheme 
should have greater impact in reducing vulnerability of the poor households especially the old 
headed households. But there is no positive impact observed for the households with 
consumption rationing and occasional starvation (Table-14). However, a positive difference 
is found in three full meals situation only. Participants in old age pension have higher 
percentage of three full meals a day. Similar pattern is found at the district level also. This 
suggests that old headed households are in more vulnerable condition. 
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The safety net statistics against occupation shows that targeting has been fairly successful for 
day laborers but for beggars and agricultural employees a negligible portion has been covered 
by all or any of these safety net programs. Hence, a large number of extremely vulnerable 
households have been left out of the social safety net. 
 
 
Section 7: Econometric Model and Estimation Result 
 
In order to derive consistent result of the impact of migration on seasonal deprivation, we 
have used three techniques. These are Heckman Probit, Propensity Matching Score and Logit 
technique. These techniques and its applications in this paper are briefly discussed. 
 
Section 7.1 Estimation of Impact of Social Safety Net Using Heckman Probit Technique 
The basic objective is to assess the impact of social safety net programs on reducing seasonal 
deprivation. We are dealing with two endogenous variables – seasonal deprivation and social 
safety net and observing the impact of various explanatory variables on seasonal deprivation 
and social safety net programs and then measuring the seasonal deprivation conditional upon 
social safety net. This conditionality may usually divulge the correlation between the errors 
of the two endogenous variables and this may create the potential risk of sample selectivity 
bias.  
The bivariate sample selection model comprises a participant or selection equation that 
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The model specifies that  2y  is observed when 0
*
1 >y , whereas 2y  need not take on any 
meaningful value when 0*1 ≤y . The standard model specifies a linear model with additive 
errors for the latent variables, so 
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Where *1y  and 
*
2y represent the unobservable variable for individual i and this is linearly 
determined. The intercept terms, α are constant terms; x refers to the set of observable 
exogenous variables and 1ε  and 2ε  are the error terms, which are normally distributed with 
mean zero and variance equals to 1. The problem of estimating 2β  arises if the two errors 1ε
and 2ε  are correlated.  
 
For objective purposes we have constructed separate binomial Probit models to test for the 
determinants of seasonal deprivation (SD) and recipients of social safety net programs 
(SSNP), with the respective dependent variables are defined as: 
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Given (1) and (2), for *1y > 0 we observe
*
2y , with probability equal to the probability that
*
1y > 
0 times the conditional probability of *2y  given that
*
1y > 0. Thus for positive 2y  the density of 
the observables is ]0Pr[)0|( *1
*
1
*
2
* >×> yyyf . For 0*1 ≤y  all that is observed is that this event 
has occurred, and the density is the probability if this event occurring. The bivariate sample 
selection model therefore has likelihood function 
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Where the first term is discrete contribution when 0*1 ≤iy , since then 01 =iy , and the second 
term is the continuous contribution when 0*1 >iy . This likelihood function is applicable to 
quite general models, not just linear models with joint normal errors. 
 
We consider the truncated mean in the sample selectivity model where only positive values of 
2y  are used. Therefore, under the assumption of correlation between the error terms 
according to a bivariate standard normal distribution with correlation coefficient ρ, the 
probability model is expressed as: 
In general this is 
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Where x  denotes the vector of all explanatory variables in the outcome and selection 
equations. If the errors 1ε and 2ε  are not correlated then the last term of the expression (4) 
simplifies to 0][ 2 =eE  
 
However, any correlation between the two errors means that the truncated mean is no longer 
22βx′  and we need to account for selection bias. To obtain ]|[ 1112 βεε xE ′−>  when 1ε and 2ε  are 
correlated, Heckman noted that if the errors are normal, then we have 
 ξεσε += 1122          (5) 
Here the random variableξ  is independent of 1ε . 
 
Using (5), the truncated mean (4) becomes 
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The selection term is similar to Tobit model and then we can write 
 )(]0,|[ 111222
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Where 
)(
)(
•Φ
•= φλ  andφ  and Φ represent the density and cumulative functions of the standard 
normal distribution, respectively.  
 
The probability model (6) is equivalent to the original probit model but for the addition of a 
selection correction term )(•λ  with coefficient value 12σ , which is included to adjust for the 
non-random sample. This selection term allows for changes in the independent variables to 
affect both the probability that the household is affected by seasonal deprivation and the 
probability that they receive social safety net support (Greene 2003). If it is proven that 12σ
differs significantly from zero, that is, the error terms are correlated, a regression based only 
on observed data for 1y  and 2y would be subject to an omitted-variable problem (Greene 
2003, 2005). The value of ρ which is equal to 2
2
12
σ
σ , is used to evaluate the risk of selection 
bias and assesses whether it is necessary to employ the selection model. If ρ differs 
significantly from zero, there is reason to reject the null hypothesis that no correlation exists. 
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Alternatively, if ρ is non-significant, there is no evidence of selection bias and no reason to 
apply the two-step selection model. In this circumstance, the standard Probit will deliver the 
more consistent and unbiased estimates. In the output results, the values of both ρ and λ will 
be estimated and their level of significance assessed. 
 
Conditioning the observable 2y  on the unobservable
*
1y and
*
2y , then un-conditioning yields 
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The seasonal deprivation and social safety net support (as defined in (1) and (2)) are 
regressed on following explanatory variables: age of household head, family size, number of 
working male members over 12 years in the family, own land (homestead, cultivate) 
employment (salaried, agriculture, non-agriculture, day labor, beggar), presence of NGO, 
equipment (agricultural tools, transports), own business. The Probit selection technique 
requires that there be a variable included in the selection equation but not the outcome 
equation to function as an exclusion restriction. For this purpose, the variable “own small 
business” (which denotes the non-recipient of social safety net) is included as an explanatory 
variable in the selection equation but not the outcome equation. 
 
 
Section 7.2: Estimation of Impact of Social Safety Net Programs Using Propensity Score 
Matching 
 
The Propensity Score Matching has achieved popularity more recently as a tool of evaluation. 
It assumes that selection can be explained purely in terms of observable characteristics. 
Applying the method is, in principle, simple. For every individual in the treatment group a 
matching individual is found from among the non-treatment group. The choice of match is 
dictated by observable characteristics. What is required is to match each treatment group 
individual with individuals sharing similar characteristics. The mean effect of treatment can 
then be calculated as the average difference in outcomes between the treated and non-treated.  
 
Our goal is to estimate the effect of social Safety Net Programs on economic hardship. Let us 
define  
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We then define the outcome of social Safety Net Programs )1( =S  as 1y and the outcome of 
no social Safety Net Programs )0( =S  as 0y . Our goal is to identify the average treatment 
effect on the treated (ATT). The average treatment effect on the treated is defined as benefits  
 
)0/()1/()1/( 011 =−===−= SyESyESyyEATT o                           1 
 
We can observe the first term of the equation (1), but the second term is not observable 
because it is not possible to observe the same individuals as recipient and non-recipient of 
any safety net benefit simultaneously. We will use the propensity score matching to estimate 
the term )0/( 0 =SyE . 
 
The estimation of an average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is an observational study. 
That’s why the estimation procedure can produce the bias if we use a non experimental 
estimator. The problem is that the assignment of subjects to the treatment and control groups 
is not random and therefore the estimation of the ATT is usually biased as a result of the 
existence of confounding factors. For that reason, the matching between treated and control 
groups becomes difficult when there are n -dimensional vector of characteristics. 
 
One way to tackle this problem is by using propensity score matching (PSM) method which 
summarizes the pre-treatment characteristics of each subject into a single index variable, the 
propensity score, which is then used to generate the matching. The propensity score matching 
is used to reduce the bias by comparing the treatment and control groups whose observational 
characteristics are as similar as possible.  
 
For matching certain assumption must be hold. The fundamental assumption underlying 
matching is conditional independence assumption (CIA). In our case the assumption is 
represented by  
  ,/0 XSy ⊥                                                                                             2 
Where X is a vector of variables that are unaffected by the treatment. The assumption states 
that, conditional on a set of variables X , economic hardship for those who do not receive any 
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safety net benefit is independent of actual treatment status. In our study we consider the 
following explanatory variables in determining the effect of social Safety Net Programs on 
seasonal economic hardship: age of household head, family size, number of working male 
members over 12 years in the family, own land (homestead, cultivate) employment status 
(salaried, agriculture, non-agriculture, day labor, beggar), presence of NGO and Char, 
equipment (agricultural tools, transport), own business.  
 
Secondly, to identify the treatment effect on the treated, matching also requires that 
 
1)/1Pr( <= XS                                                                                     3 
 
This common support condition requires that at each level of X, the probability of observing 
non-recipients is positive.  
 
Matching on all variables in X becomes impractical as the number of variables increases. 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that if the conditions of equation 2 and 3 hold, matching 
can be performed conditioning on an index function )(XP  alone rather than on X , where 
)/1Pr()( XSXP ==  is the probability of participating conditional on X . If outcomes are 
independent of treatment status given X, then they are also independent of treatment status 
given )(XP . Propensity score matching matches on a single index )(XP instead of all 
variables in X. This powerful result overcomes the curse of dimensionality in multi-
dimensional matching. 
 
In order to estimate the propensity score, any standard model such as Logit or probit can be 
used. It is important to remember that the role of propensity score is only to reduce the 
dimensions of the conditioning; as such, it has no behavioral assumptions attached to it. For 
case of estimation, we use the Logit model which is as follows:  
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Where iS  is the treatment status and )( iXh  is made up of linear and higher-order terms of 
the covariates on which we condition to obtain an ignorable treatment assignment. The 
coefficients λ  can be estimated by using the maximum likelihood estimation method.  
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The propensity score can be expressed as  
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Besides predicted probability itself, Logit, ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
− )(1
)(log
XP
XP , Odds Ratio and Linear Index can 
also be defined as propensity score as long as its distribution approximates to normal. In our 
study we use the predicted probability as the propensity score to determine the effect of social 
Safety Net Programs on economic hardship.  
            
                          
Section 7.3: Estimation of Impact of Social Safety Net Using Generalized Ordered Logit 
 
Since we are dealing with a natural ordering of different alternatives, such as occasional 
starvation (1), consumption rationing (2) and three full meals (3), such data can be estimated 
by unordered multinomial model, but there is a much more parsimonious model and sensible 
model that take account of this ordering. In recent year, generalized ordered logit (gologit) 
has drawn attention to the researchers for its superiority than the multinomial logit and other 
order logit models. 
 
The gologit model can be written as follows 
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Where, M is the number of categories of the ordinal dependent variable. From the above, it 
can be determined that the probabilities that Y will take on each of the values 1… M is equal 
to 
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The gologit model yields some special cases. For the case M = 2, the gologit model is 
equivalent to the logistic regression model. For the condition M > 2, the gologit model 
becomes equivalent to a series of binary logistic regressions where categories of the 
dependent variable are combined, for example, if M = 4, then for J = 1 category 1 is 
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contrasted with categories 2, 3 and 4; for J = 2 the contrast is between categories 1 and 2 
versus 3 and 4; and for J = 3, it is categories 1, 2 and 3 versus category 4. 
 
The major strength of gologit is that it can estimate three special cases of the generalized 
model: the proportional odds/parallel lines model, the partial proportional odds model, and 
the logistic regression model. Hence, gologit can estimate models that are less restrictive 
than the parallel lines models estimated by ologit (whose assumptions are often violated) but 
more parsimonious and interpretable than those estimated by a non-ordinal method, such as 
multinomial logistic regression (i.e. mlogit). Other key advantages of gologit include support 
for linear constraints (making it possible to use gologit for constrained logistic regression). 
 
Section 7.4:  Empirical Analysis 
 
The role of social safety net programs in attenuating the poverty led hardship is well 
acknowledged. Likewise, we desire to assess the role of these programs in reducing the extent 
of monga. This could be explained by the macroeconomic intervention so that the household 
consumption can be smoothened in monga and normal period.  
 
We classified poor households into three groups – extreme poor, moderate poor and marginal 
poor – in order to clearly understand the impact of social safety net programs. Extremely poor 
households are those that remain on occasional starvation in both monga and normal time. 
Marginal poor households are those that continue to have three full meals even in monga 
time. The remaining households are classified as moderate poor. 
 
As argued earlier, we have used several techniques to derive consistent results of the impact 
of social safety net programs. These include Heckman Probit, Propensity Score Matching, 
Probit and Generalized Ordered Logit. We have separately estimated for VGD/VGF and old 
age pension scheme. 
 
Estimation of Parameters Using Heckman Probit  
Heckman Probit determines seasonal deprivation conditional up on social safety net 
programs. As both are endogenous, the errors are likely to be correlated. Therefore, we used 
Heckman Probit as errors are correlated and statistically significant 
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In the outcome and selection equations (Table 15A and Table-15B), the variables – age of 
household head, family size, no. of working male family members over 12 years, own land 
(homestead, cultivable,, under river), number of employment, dummy of (monthly salaried, 
employed in agriculture and non-agriculture, day laborer, beggar, owned livestock, presence 
of NGO and presence of Char the village), ownership of tin made room, economic wealth 
(owning agricultural equipment, fish culture, transport, small business, small cottage 
industry), own saving and old pension. The variable “live in other’s property” appears in the 
selection equation, but is absent in the outcome equation. The basic objective of including the 
same variables in the outcome and selection equations except the variable “live in other’s 
property” is that the presence of variables in the outcome and selection equations indicates 
that the slope coefficients in the outcome equation is affected by its presence in the selection  
 
The determinants of social safety net programs have been put forward in descriptive analysis. 
An empirical analysis is needed to validate the descriptive findings. We have performed this 
via the selection equation of Heckman Probit technique (Table – 15A). The results reveal that 
the household head being relatively old has the higher probability of getting the social safety 
net support. Family size plays a vital role in determining the participation of social safety net. 
The larger the family size is, the greater is the possibility of receiving the safety net supports 
like VGD/VGF, old pensions, grants etc. The coefficient of the variable “family size” in the 
selection equation of Heckman Probit model is highly significant. Number of male active 
members (over 12 years) was used as a proxy for higher income. Therefore it was expected 
that social safety net programs would be placed to the households with lower income 
households. This was validated by negative and significant coefficient of the variable. Assets 
such as land holding, number of tin roofed homes and economic wealth (e.g. agriculture and 
transport equipments etc.) also determines the distribution of safety net supports. It is evident 
from the result that there is an inverse relationship between assets and placement of safety net 
programs. This is logical and economically pertinent. The service holders and the non-
agricultural sef employment have the lower probability of receiving the safety net supports. 
On the other hand, day labor and beggar are the most vulnerable and have the largest 
possibility of being the recipients of safety net programs. This is also verified by the 
respective coefficients. Households in Char areas are more vulnerable than others because of 
relatively less accessibility, natural calamities, and limited economic opportunities. As such, 
it is expected that social safety net programs will be placed more in Char areas. The 
significant coefficient suggests this hypothesis. 
 29
 
Table-15B presents determinants of seasonal deprivations (extreme and moderate poor) 
conditional upon social safety net programs. As evident, households with younger heads are 
likely to be less extreme poor, but the relationship is inverse for the moderate poor. Older 
headed households are less likely to be moderate poor. Family size does not have any impact. 
Assets matter. Assets – own and cultivable land, number of tin roofed homes, and economic 
wealth, contribute to reduce the likelihood likely to be extreme poor. Social safety net 
programs particularly VGD/VGF is likely to be effective for extreme poor. Net savings for 
future smoothens consumptions, and therefore, it is expected to reduce degree of poverty in 
terms of change in consumption. 
 
Estimation of Parameters Using Propensity Score Matching 
To find a reliable comparison group, the eminent approach – PSM (Propensity Score 
Matching) is used. The comparison group can be formed by picking the “nearest neighbor” 
for each participant, defined as the non-participant that minimizes the difference in the 
propensity score between participant and mom-participant, as long as this does not exceed 
some reasonable bound.  
 
In order to derive a consistent estimate, we also estimated impact of social safety net on 
different groups of poor households. Results from the PSM have been shown in Table-17. 
There is no significant impact of old age pension scheme, probably because of narrower 
coverage and small size of the program. 
 
The ATT estimate of VGD/VGF is -0.014 which indicates that the participants of the 
VGD/VGF programs will be 1.4 percent less in extreme poor than the non-participant group 
(Table-16). But the scenario is excruciating when we assess the impact of VGD/VGF on 
moderate group (Table-16). The result divulges that the participants of VGD/VGF programs 
will be 2.5 percent more likely to be moderate poor group than the non-participants. 
 
Estimation of Parameters Using Probit Model 
The probit technique was also employed to find out consistency of the results that we derive 
by using other techniques. The technique was used separately for participants in social safety 
net programs, non-participants and all poor households with a dummy variable for social 
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safety net programs. The results were generated separately for VGD/VGF and old age 
pension scheme.  
 
The signs of other parameters are same as in Table-17 and Table-18. The dummy variable for 
VGD/VGF has negative sign. The coefficient of VGD/VGF was estimated to be -0.189 in 
moderate poor and -0.220 in extreme poor groups. These results suggest that the participants 
in VGD/VGF program are likely to be better off than the non-participants. This is consistent 
with what we found in PSM. The old age pension scheme is not effective as observed in 
probit results. This was also found in PSM as the relevant coefficients are insignificant. 
 
Estimation of Parameters Using Generalized Ordered Logit 
 
Yet another model has been used to justify the consistency of our findings. All the above 
three - Heckman, PSM and Probit measures consistently indicated that VGD/VGD have 
significant impact in reducing vulnerability of the poor households during monga. For all the 
participants, this is evident that VGD/VGF helps to reduce extreme poverty but no such 
positive effect for the moderate poor is observed (Table 19). The coefficient for extreme poor 
is highly significant (coefficient value of -0.543) strongly suggests that these households are 
more likely to scale up to moderate poor by participation in the VGD and VGF. Inversely the 
moderate poor households have a fair probability to scale down to extreme poor. Contrary to 
this result, old age pension coefficient shows negative sign for both moderate and extreme 
poor. This result is statistically highly significant as observed. Therefore, the result strongly 
suggests that the old age pension scheme has no positive impact in improving the poverty 
status of the poor households for both moderate and extreme groups. This result is fully 
consistent with earlier findings derived from Heckman, Probit and PSM models. 
 
No. of working male family members over 12 years, own homestead land, or cultivable land, 
economic wealth, and existence of past savings, have all the way positive coefficients 
indicating that the more prevalence of these parameters would contribute to move up from 
extreme poor to moderate poor and also from moderate poor to marginal poor (Table-19). On 
the other hand, large family size increases the likelihood of being worse off. Households 
having self employment in agriculture are likely to be significantly better off for both 
moderate and extreme groups, and households with monthly salaried employees are better off 
only if they are the member of moderate poor category. But this more important that the signs 
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for non-agriculture, labor and beggar are negative strongly suggesting that these groups are 
more vulnerable. 
 
In Char areas, households are more likely to be extreme poor. Although households in Char 
areas are the most vulnerable, the households in extreme poor are more likely to move up 
from extreme poor to moderate poor. This possibly reflects intensity of support services. 
 
The old age pension, as we derived in the earlier parts, shows negative coefficient but 
statistically significant for both moderate and extreme poor groups. Therefore, the finding 
that old age pension does not benefit the extremely poor households or the households in the 
moderate poor reinforces the earlier findings using other statistical techniques.. 
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Section 8: Conclusion and Policy implications 
 
The basic objective of this paper was to assess impact of social safety net programs in 
mitigating monga using the PKSF-InM census survey data of poor households in the Greater 
Rangpur region. We used several econometric techniques to derive consistent results. 
 
Several findings emerged from the empirical Analysis. First, VGD/VGF have positive impact 
on mitigating monga. Second, old age pension appears to be ineffective probably because of 
targeting of extreme vulnerable older people. Third, the programs are relatively well placed. 
Fourth, households with labor as occupation are less covered under these programs although 
they are the most vulnerable. It is understandable that the designs of the programs are not 
targeted towards laborers. It seems that a separate scheme may be required for them. Fifth, 
households in the Char areas are vulnerable. Provision of social safety net programs for these 
households will help theme to move from extreme poor to moderate poor. Sixth, savings 
positively contribute to consumption smoothening, for both extreme and moderate poor. 
Introduction of appropriate savings instruments may contribute higher savings. 
 
Since VGD/VGF programs are effective, it will be probably to correct to argue that the 
programs should be expanded. Program deepening has to be increased. Although old age 
pension appears to be less effective at the household level, probably it may have positive 
impact at the individual level. There is also a need to deepen the program both in terms of 
coverage and size. This is required in view of the fact that individual cannot be separated 
from the family. 
 
Expansion of VGD/VGF and old age pension schemes will effectively contribute to 
mitigating monga. On the other hand, it will also reduce cost of short term measures for the 
government as expansion of annual programs like VGD/VGF will reduce the incidence and 
intensity of monga. 
 
 
--------------------- 
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Table-1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table - 2 
Amount of Payment under programs per household per year (HIES: 2005) 
Type of program Average (BDT) 
Total 781 
VGD and VGF 916 
IFS 2549 
FF W/M FW 502 
Test relief 423 
VGF 439 
GR 1333 
Food for education  628 
RMP 450 
Old age allowance  1429 
Freedom fighter 2364 
Other 765 
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Table-3 
Coverage Rates: 2000 HIES Findings for Major Programs 
 
Program 
percent households living 
in a village where program was 
offered 
Estimated number 
of beneficiary households 
percent of rural 
households covered 
 (1) (3) (4) 
FFW 67.7 percent -- -- 
VGD and 
VGF 
56.8 percent 
562,344 2.9 percent 
VGF 63.3 percent 1,560,597 8.0 percent 
FFE 28.3 percent 1,466,834 7.5 percent 
      Source: The World Bank Study, 2004 
        Note: Column 3 and 4 derived based on the 2001 Households Census’s estimate of 19.43 million households living  
    in rural areas in Bangladesh. 
 
Table-4 
Social Safety Net Coverage: HIES - 2005 
Area Total Rural Urban 
National 13.06 15.64 5.45 
Barishal 13.34 14.79 5.00 
Chittagong 11.05 12.89 5.72 
Dhaka 14.33 19.98 4.94 
Khulna 9.51 11.03 4.23 
Rajshahi 12.35 13.02 7.71 
Sylhet 22.42 24.31 11.25 
 
Table – 5 
Beneficiary Coverage in (percent) under Different Programs 
 Type of Program Total Barisal Chittagong Dhaka  Khulna Rajshahi Sylhet 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
VGD and VGF 17.59 17.39 9.90 24.79 12.80 17.11 8.84 
IFS 0.33    3.76   
FF W/M FW 0.25 1.14 0.58 0.25    
Test relief 11.87 1.57 28.64 4.15 18.26 14.66 9.65 
VGF 33.86 17.82 30.53 32.77 18.70 38.97 55.62 
GR 0.58 1.14 3.49     
Food for Education  8.41 33.07 1.16 13.58 13.45   
RMP 0.12  0.81     
Old age allowance  17.91 25.36 17.42 11.94 23.19 25.80 11.44 
Freedom fighter 0.73  0.58 1.07 0.94 0.69  
Other 11.24 12.68 15.08 11.40 7.87 7.03 18.06 
 percent of 
household  
13.06 13.34 11.05 14.33 9.51 12.35 22.42 
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Table - 6 
 
Expenditures on safety net programs (US $ millions,1996-2004) 
Program name 1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999-00 2000-1 2001-2 2002-3 2003-4 2004-5 
Children and youth-conditional cash transfers 
FFE RESR 60.62 67.74 71.87 74 64.1 70.38 109.35 103.63 106.97 
FSSAP 34.95 37.03 39.61 43.52 52.12 50.45 50.46 41.89 43.24 
Working age households-public works/emergency relief 
FFW 149.16 151.01 130.06 151.54 164.48 123.95 75.87 40.93 88.79 
VGD and VGF 39.6 40.66 37.97 42.87 43.86 42.72 40.49 37.92 35.66 
Others 47.11 46.73 38.21 51.14 36.99 43.6 34.33 35.01 38.15 
The elderly-cash transfer 
old aged allowance 0 4.7 8.91 9.21 9.29 8.79 12.62 31.09 42.36 
other risk groups-public works          
VGF 0 13.77 106.3 43.05 55.2 23.03 18.26 29.8 17.83 
Other risk groups-cash transfers 
Fund for national transfer 0 0 4.54 4.7 4.65 4.4 6.81 15.54 21.18 
allowance for widows 0 0 2.73 2.82 2.79 5.06 4.85 3.11 3.85 
Freedom fighters fund 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.21 8.64 13.37 
Funds for other groups 0 0 0 12.82 5.77 11.6 4.57 11.25 13.37 
Summary and targeted households 1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999-00 2000-1 2001-2 2002-3 2003-4 2004-5 
For children and young 95.57 104.77 111.48 117.52 116.23 120.83 159.82 145.52 150.21 
For working age households 235.87 238.4 206.25 245.54 245.33 210.28 150.69 113.86 162.6 
For the elderly 0 4.7 8.91 9.21 9.29 8.79 12.62 31.09 42.36 
For other risk groups 0 13.77 113.57 63.45 68.4 44.1 38.7 78.33 69.6 
Total 331.44 361.64 440.21 435.72 439.25 384 361.83 368.8 424.77 
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Table-7 
Having VGD and VGF card by District in Greater Rangpur 
 District 
Have VGD and 
VGF card 
Gaibandha 
N=120,608 
Kurigram 
N=1,30,006 
Lalmonirhat 
N=102,936 
Nilphamari 
N=56,925 
Rangpur 
N=72,473 
District total 
N=482,948 
No (%) 
 
94.16 98.31 88.69 98.33 88.25 93.71 
Yes (%) 
 
5.84 1.69 11.31 1.67 11.75 6.29 
 
 
 
Table- 8 
Receiving Old-age Pension by District in Greater Rangpur 
 District  
Old age 
pension 
Lalmonirhat 
N=102,936 
Kurigram 
N=1,30,006 
Gaibandha 
N=120,608 
Nilphamari 
N=56,925 
Rangpur 
N=72,473 
District total 
N=482,948 
 
No (%) 
 
96.80 98.79 98.29 98.11 97.39 97.95 
Yes (%) 
 
3.20 1.21 1.71 1.89 2.61 2.05 
 
 
 
Table – 9 
Safety Net Programs and family size 
Family 
size 
No safety 
Net 
programs 
VGD and 
VGF 
Old 
pensions 
Subsistence 
support 
Asset 
assistance 
All 
combination 
Total 
 54,705 1,309 2,470 22,357 514 6,500 87,855 
0-2 (62.27) (1.49) (2.81) (25.45) (0.59) (7.40) (100.00) 
  [17.27] [16.34] [48.00] [18.30] [19.37] [23.07] [18.19] 
  163,996 3,824 1,634 58,316 1,295 12,353 241,418 
2-4 (67.93) (1.58) (0.68) (24.16) (0.54) (5.12) (100.00) 
  [51.76] [47.75] [31.75] [47.74] [48.81] [43.84] [49.99] 
  82,568 2,387 825 34,282 691 7,552 128,305 
4-6 (64.35) (1.86) (0.64) (26.72) (0.54) (5.89) (100.00) 
  [26.06] [29.80] [16.03] [28.07] [26.05] [26.80] [26.57] 
  15,550 489 217 7,186 153 1,775 25,370 
>6 (61.29) (1.93) (0.86) (28.32) (0.60) (7.00) (100.00) 
  [4.91] [6.11] [4.22] [5.88] [5.77] [6.30] [5.25] 
  316,819 8,009 5,146 122,141 2,653 28,180 482,948 
Total (65.60) (1.66) (1.07) (25.29) (0.55) (5.83) (100.00) 
  [100.00] [100.00] [100.00] [100.00] [100.00] [100.00] [100.00] 
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Table – 10 
Safety Net Programs and land holding 
Land No safety 
Net 
programs 
VGD and 
VGF 
Old 
pensions 
Subsistence 
support 
Asset 
assistance 
All 
combination 
Total 
0 63,487 1,856 1,404 32,288 743 7,700 107,478 
  (59.07) (1.73) (1.31) (30.04) (0.69) (7.16) (100.00) 
  [20.04] [23.17] [27.28] [26.44] [28.01] [27.32] [22.25] 
up to 25 220,569 5,469 3,311 80,041 1,737 18,187 329,314 
  (66.98) (1.66) (1.01) (24.31) (0.53) (5.52) (100.00) 
  [69.62] [68.29] [64.34] [65.53] [65.47] [64.54] [68.19] 
25-50 29,534 618 402 9,018 152 2,066 41,790 
  (70.67) (1.48) (0.96) (21.58) (0.36) (4.94) (100.00) 
  [9.32] [7.72] [7.81] [7.38] [5.73] [7.33] [8.65] 
50-75 2,644 52 21 627 17 177 3,538 
  (74.73) (1.47) (0.59) (17.72) (0.48) (5.00) (100.00) 
  [0.83] [0.65] [0.41] [0.51] [0.64] [0.63] [0.73] 
75-100 431 8 7 115 4 39 604 
  (71.36) (1.32) (1.16) (19.04) (0.66) (6.46) (100.00) 
  [0.14] [0.10] [0.14] [0.09] [0.15] [0.14] [0.13] 
100-150 112 6 1 31 0 10 160 
  (70.00) (3.75) (0.63) (19.38) (0.00) (6.25) (100.00) 
  [0.04] [0.07] [0.02] [0.03] [0.00] [0.04] [0.03] 
>150 42 0 0 21 0 1 64 
  (65.63) (0.00) (0.00) (32.81) (0.00) (1.56) (100.00) 
  [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] 
Total 316,819 8,009 5,146 122,141 2,653 28,180 482,948 
  (65.60) (1.66) (1.07) (25.29) (0.55) (5.83) (100.00) 
  [100.00] [100.00] [100.00] [100.00] [100.00] [100.00] [100.00] 
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Table –11 
Safety Net Programs and age category  
Age No safety 
Net 
programs 
VGD and 
VGF 
Old 
pensions 
Subsistence 
support 
Asset 
assistance 
All 
combination 
Total 
to 20 5,592 116 89 1,822 43 382 8,044 
  (69.52) (1.44) (1.11) (22.65) (0.53) (4.75) (100.00) 
  [1.77] [1.45] [1.73] [1.49] [1.62] [1.36] [1.67] 
20-30 94,713 1,889 520 30,689 658 5,730 134,199 
  (70.58) (1.41) (0.39) (22.87) (0.49) (4.27) (100.00) 
  [29.90] [23.59] [10.10] [25.13] [24.80] [20.33] [27.79] 
30-40 109,680 2,734 745 41,699 909 8,679 164,446 
  (66.70) (1.66) (0.45) (25.36) (0.55) (5.28) (100.00) 
  [34.62] [34.14] [14.48] [34.14] [34.26] [30.80] [34.05] 
40-50 61,397 1,823 859 26,379 556 6,397 97,411 
  (63.03) (1.87) (0.88) (27.08) (0.57) (6.57) (100.00) 
  [19.38] [22.76] [16.69] [21.60] [20.96] [22.70] [20.17] 
50-60 28,859 970 1,138 13,388 310 3,917 48,582 
  (59.40) (2.00) (2.34) (27.56) (0.64) (8.06) (100.00) 
  [9.11] [12.11] [22.11] [10.96] [11.68] [13.90] [10.06] 
60-70 12,553 370 1,112 6,172 135 2,213 22,555 
  (55.66) (1.64) (4.93) (27.36) (0.60) (9.81) (100.00) 
  [3.96] [4.62] [21.61] [5.05] [5.09] [7.85] [4.67] 
>70 4,023 107 683 1,992 42 862 7,709 
  (52.19) (1.39) (8.86) (25.84) (0.54) (11.18) (100.00) 
  [1.27] [1.34] [13.27] [1.63] [1.58] [3.06] [1.60] 
Total 316,817 8,009 5,146 122,141 2,653 28,180 482,946 
  (65.60) (1.66) (1.07) (25.29) (0.55) (5.84) (100.00) 
  [100.00] [100.00] [100.00] [100.00] [100.00] [100.00] [100.00] 
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Table – 12 
Safety Net Programs and occupation  
Occupation No safety 
Net 
programs 
VGD 
and VGF 
Old 
pensions 
Subsistence 
support 
Asset 
assistance 
Any one 
of the 
safety 
net 
program 
Total 
 202,829 5,154 2,940 80,411 1,748 18,206 311,288 
Day labor (65.16) (1.66) (0.94) (25.83) (0.56) (5.85) (100.00)
  [64.02] [64.35] [57.13] [65.83] [65.89] [64.61] [64.46] 
  8,868 127 121 2,704 65 458 12,343 
Employment 
in agriculture (71.85) (1.03) (0.98) (21.91) (0.53) (3.71) (100.00)
  [2.80] [1.59] [2.35] [2.21] [2.45] [1.63] [2.56] 
  37,239 1,014 400 12,031 229 2,889 53,802 
Employment 
in non-
agriculture (69.21) (1.88) (0.74) (22.36) (0.43) (5.37) (100.00)
  [11.75] [12.66] [7.77] [9.85] [8.63] [10.25] [11.14] 
  1,020 20 17 334 5 114 1,510 
Monthly 
salaried (67.55) (1.32) (1.13) (22.12) (0.33) (7.55) (100.00)
  [0.32] [0.25] [0.33] [0.27] [0.19] [0.40] [0.31] 
 941 59 129 559 24 261 1,973 
Beggar   (47.69) (2.99) (6.54) (28.33) (1.22) (13.23) (100.00)
  [0.30] [0.74] [2.51] [0.46] [0.90] [0.93] [0.41] 
 65,922 1,635 1,539 26,102 582 6,252 102,032 
All others   (64.61) (1.60) (1.51) (25.58) (0.57) (6.13) (100.00)
  [20.81] [20.41] [29.91] [21.37] [21.94] [22.19] [21.13] 
 316,819 8,009 5,146 122,141 2,653 28,180 482,948 
Total  (65.60) (1.66) (1.07) (25.29) (0.55) (5.83) (100.00)
  [100.00] [100.00] [100.00] [100.00] [100.00] [100.00] [100.00] 
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Table: 13 
Consumption ordering per day by VGD and VGF 
D
is
tri
ct
 
Have 
VGD 
and VGF 
card? 
2006 monga: Consumption ordering per day 2007:  Consumption ordering per day  Total 
Occasional 
starvation 
Consumpt
ion 
rationing 
Three full 
meals 
Occasional 
starvation 
Consumpt
ion 
rationing 
Three full 
meals 
G
ai
ba
nd
ha
 
No 55,222 
(48.63) 
[94.55] 
56,678 
(49.91) 
[93.65] 
1,656 
(1.46) 
[99.04] 
2,268 
(2.00) 
[90.58] 
55,480 
(48.86) 
[93.26] 
55,808 
(49.15) 
[95.23] 
113,556 
(100.00) 
[94.16] 
Yes 
 
3,183 
(45.21) 
[5.45] 
3,841 
(54.56) 
[6.35] 
16 
(0.23) 
[0.96] 
236 
(3.35) 
[9.42] 
4,010 
(56.96) 
[6.74] 
2,794 
(39.69) 
[4.77] 
7,040 
(100.00) 
[5.84] 
Total 
 
58,405 
(48.43) 
[100.00] 
60,519 
(50.18) 
[100.00] 
1,672 
(1.39) 
[100.00] 
2,504 
(2.08) 
[100.00] 
59,490 
(49.33) 
[100.00] 
58,602 
(48.59) 
[100.00] 
120,596 
(100.00) 
[100.00] 
K
ur
ig
ra
m No 73,443 
57.52 
98.43 
52,168 
40.86 
98.09 
2,061 
1.61 
99.28 
15,600 
12.22 
98.55 
80,876 
63.35 
98.36 
31,193 
24.43 
98.04 
127,672 
100.00 
98.30 
Yes 
 
1,171 
53.15 
1.57 
1,017 
46.16 
1.91 
15 
0.68 
0.72 
229 
10.39 
1.45 
1,351 
61.33 
1.64 
623 
28.28 
1.96 
2,203 
100.00 
1.70 
Total 
 
74,614 
57.45 
100.00 
53,185 
40.95 
100.00 
2,076 
1.60 
100.00 
15,829 
12.19 
100.00 
82,227 
63.31 
100.00 
31,816 
24.50 
100.00 
129,875 
100.00 
100.00 
La
m
on
irh
at
 
No 23,678 
25.94 
87.91 
55,499 
60.79 
89.32 
12,112 
13.27 
87.33 
2,108 
2.31 
88.20 
29,804 
32.65 
88.02 
59,377 
65.04 
89.04 
91,289 
100.00 
88.69 
Yes 
 
3,256 
27.96 
12.09 
6,634 
56.96 
10.68 
1,757 
15.09 
12.67 
282 
2.42 
11.80 
4,055 
34.82 
11.98 
7,310 
62.76 
10.96 
11,647 
100.00 
11.31 
Total 
 
26,934 
26.17 
100.00 
62,133 
60.36 
100.00 
13,869 
13.47 
100.00 
2,390 
2.32 
100.00 
33,859 
32.89 
100.00 
66,687 
64.78 
100.00 
102,936 
100.00 
100.00 
N
ilp
ha
m
ar
i 
No 26,943 
48.19 
98.78 
27,579 
49.32 
97.91 
1,393 
2.49 
97.75 
8,086 
14.46 
98.98 
30,736 
54.97 
98.61 
17,093 
30.57 
97.51 
55,915 
100.00 
98.32 
Yes 
 
332 
34.84 
1.22 
589 
61.80 
2.09 
32 
3.36 
2.25 
83 
8.71 
1.02 
434 
45.54 
1.39 
436 
45.75 
2.49 
953 
100.00 
1.68 
Total 
 
27,275 
47.96 
100.00 
28,168 
49.53 
100.00 
1,425 
2.51 
100.00 
8,169 
14.36 
100.00 
31,170 
54.81 
100.00 
17,529 
30.82 
100.00 
56,868 
100.00 
100.00 
R
an
gp
ur
 
No 34,680 
(54.51) 
[85.45] 
26,646 
(41.88) 
[91.36] 
2,294 
(3.61) 
[96.47] 
11,503 
(18.00) 
[92.75] 
32,479 
(50.83) 
[84.01] 
19,920 
(31.17) 
[93.28] 
63,902 
(100.00)  
[88.24] 
Yes 
 
5,905 
(69.39) 
[14.55] 
2,521 
(29.62) 
[8.64] 
84 
(0.99) 
[3.53] 
899 
(10.56) 
[7.25] 
6,184 
(72.61) 
[15.99] 
1,434 
(16.84) 
[6.72] 
8,517 
(100.00)  
[11.76] 
Total 
 
40,585 
(56.27) 
[100.00] 
29,167 
(40.44) 
[100.00] 
2,378 
(3.30} 
[100.00] 
12,402 
(17.13) 
[100.00] 
38,663 
(53.39) 
[100.00] 
21,354 
(29.49) 
[100.00] 
72,419 
(100.00)  
[100.00] 
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Table- 14  
Consumption ordering per day by Old Age Pension 
D
is
tri
ct
 
Receives 
Pension? 
monga time: Consumption ordering 
per day 
Normal Time: Consumption ordering per 
day 
  
Total 
Occasional 
starvation 
Consumpt
ion 
rationing 
Three 
full 
meals 
Occasional 
starvation 
Consumpti
on 
rationing 
Three full 
meals 
G
ai
ba
nd
ha
 No 57,090 
(48.16) 
[97.75] 
59,790 
(50.44) 
[98.80] 
1,651 
(1.39) 
[98.74] 
2,426 
(2.05) 
[96.88] 
58,183 
(49.09) 
[97.80] 
57,922 
(48.87) 
[98.84] 
118,531 
(100.00) 
[98.29] 
Yes 1,315 
(63.68) 
[2.25] 
729 
(35.30) 
[1.20] 
21 
(1.02) 
[1.26] 
78 
(3.78) 
[3.12] 
1,307 
(63.29) 
[2.20] 
680 
(32.93) 
[1.16] 
2,065 
(100.00) 
[1.71] 
Total 58,405 
(48.43) 
[100.00] 
60,519 
(50.18) 
[100.00] 
1,672 
(1.39) 
[100.00] 
2,504 
(2.08) 
[100.00] 
59,490 
(49.33) 
[100.00] 
58,602 
(48.59) 
[100.00] 
120,596 
(100.00) 
[100.00] 
K
ur
ig
ra
m
 
No 73,603 
57.39 
98.69 
52,585 
41.00 
98.92 
2,054 
1.60 
98.94 
15,558 
12.13 
98.31 
81,237 
63.35 
98.84 
31,444 
24.52 
98.87 
128,239 
100.00 
98.79 
Yes 977 
62.03 
1.31 
576 
36.57 
1.08 
22 
1.40 
1.06 
267 
16.95 
1.69 
950 
60.32 
1.16 
358 
22.73 
1.13 
1,575 
100.00 
1.21 
Total 74,580 
57.45 
100.00 
53,161 
40.95 
100.00 
2,076 
1.60 
100.00 
15,825 
12.19 
100.00 
82,187 
63.31 
100.00 
31,802 
24.50 
100.00 
129,814 
100.00 
100.00 
La
lm
on
irh
at
 No 25,894 
25.98 
96.14 
60,273 
60.48 
97.01 
13,492 
13.54 
97.28 
2,272 
2.28 
95.06 
32,577 
32.69 
96.21 
64,810 
65.03 
97.19 
99,659 
100.00 
96.82 
Yes 1,040 
31.74 
3.86 
1,860 
56.76 
2.99 
377 
11.50 
2.72 
118 
3.60 
4.94 
1,282 
39.12 
3.79 
1,877 
57.28 
2.81 
3,277 
100.00 
3.18 
Total  26,934 
26.17 
100.00 
62,133 
60.36 
100.00 
13,869 
13.47 
100.00 
2,390 
2.32 
100.00 
33,859 
32.89 
100.00 
66,687 
64.78 
100.00 
102,936 
100.00 
100.00 
N
ilp
ha
m
ar
i No 26,763 
47.97 
98.12 
27,619 
49.50 
98.05 
1,412 
2.53 
99.09 
8,016 
14.37 
98.13 
30,502 
54.67 
97.86 
17,276 
30.96 
98.56 
55,794 
100.00 
98.11 
Yes 512 
47.67 
1.88 
549 
51.12 
1.95 
13 
1.21 
0.91 
153 
14.25 
1.87 
668 
62.20 
2.14 
253 
23.56 
1.44 
1,074 
100.00 
1.89 
Total 27,275 
47.96 
100.00 
28,168 
49.53 
100.00 
1,425 
2.51 
100.00 
8,169 
14.36 
100.00 
31,170 
54.81 
100.00 
17,529 
30.82 
100.00 
56,868 
100.00 
100.00 
R
an
gp
ur
 No 39,347 
(56.02) 
[96.95] 
28,553 
(40.65) 
[97.89] 
2,343 
(3.34) 
[98.53] 
12,098 
(17.15) 
97.55 
37,586 
(53.29) 
[97.21] 
20,846 
(29.56) 
[97.62] 
70,530 
(100.00) 
[97.39] 
Yes 1,238 
(65.61) 
[3.05] 
614 
(32.54) 
[2.11] 
35 
(1.85) 
[1.47] 
304 
(16.09) 
[2.45] 
1,077 
(57.01) 
[2.79] 
508 
(26.89) 
[2.38] 
1,889 
(100.00) 
[2.61] 
Total 40,585 
(56.27) 
[100.00] 
29,167 
(40.44) 
[100.00] 
2,378 
(3.30) 
[100.00] 
12,402 
(17.13) 
[100.00] 
38,663 
(53.39) 
[100.00] 
21,354 
(29.49) 
[100.00] 
72,419 
(100.00) 
[100.00] 
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Table – 15A 
Determinants of social safety Net Programs – VGD/VGF 
Variables  Coefficient 
Age of household head 0.022*** 
Square of age -0.000*** 
Family size 0.015*** 
No. Of working male family members over 12 years -0.064*** 
Homestead: own land -0.001** 
Cultivable: own land -0.003*** 
Dummy: monthly salaried 0.096*** 
Dummy; agriculture -0.054*** 
Dummy; non agriculture -0.012 
Dummy: day labor 0.054*** 
Dummy: beggar 0.190*** 
Own rooms: tin -0.017*** 
Business wealth 0.069*** 
Presence of Char 0.099*** 
Having past savings 0.169*** 
Presence of NGO -0.378*** 
Live in others room 0.125*** 
Constant  -1.871*** 
        Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table – 15B 
Heckman Probit model 
 Extreme poor Moderate 
poor 
 Coefficient Coefficient 
Age of household head 0.015** -0.004 
Square of age -0.000 0.000 
Family size 0.016 0.010 
No. Of working male family members over 12 years -0.103*** 0.009 
Homestead: own land -0.009*** -0.003 
Cultivable: own land -0.009*** -0.009*** 
Dummy: monthly salaried -0.133 -0.041 
Dummy; agriculture -0.128 0.039 
Dummy; non agriculture -0.001 0.009 
Dummy: day labor -0.155*** 0.186*** 
Dummy: beggar 0.262** 0.051 
Own rooms: tin -0.091*** -0.062*** 
Business wealth -0.168*** 0.040 
Presence of Char 0.174*** 0.002 
Having past savings -0.134** -0.112** 
Presence of NGO 0.141 -0.148 
Live in others room   
Constant -1.893* 1.699 
/athrho 0.242  
rho -0.9957** -0.998*** 
                 Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table - 16 
Propensity Score Matching – Social Safety Net Programs 
Area Safety net Extreme poor Moderate poor Marginal poor 
All District VGD/VGF -0.014** 0.025*** -0.111** 
Old pension -0.003 0.02 0.001 
Subsistence assistance -0.003* 0.011** -0.008*** 
Asset support 0.009* -0.003 -0.007* 
             Notes:  ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table - 17 
Probit model – VGD 
 Moderate poor Extreme poor 
 All  Non 
participant 
participant All  Non 
participant 
participant 
 coef coef coef coef coef coef 
Age of 
household head 
-0.001 0.006*** -0.001 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 
Age Square -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014 
Family size 0.013 0.008*** 0.013 -0.123*** -0.125*** -0.093*** 
No. of working 
male family 
members over 
12 years 
-0.001 0.021*** -0.001 
-0.010*** -0.010*** -0.009** 
Homestead: 
own land 
-0.004* 0.001** -0.004* -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.009*** 
Cultivable: own 
land 
-0.010*** -0.004*** -0.010*** -0.020 -0.015 -0.155 
Dummy: day 
labor 
-0.027 -0.118*** -0.027 -0.100*** -0.101*** -0.120 
Dummy: 
agriculture 
0.031 -0.018 0.031 0.250*** 0.256*** 0.001 
Dummy: non 
agriculture 
0.008 -0.201*** 0.008 0.093*** 0.093*** -0.170*** 
Dummy: day 
labor 
0.197*** -0.018** 0.197*** 0.161*** 0.113*** 0.229** 
Dummy: beggar 0.082 0.158*** 0.082 
0.009 0.012** -0.088*** 
 
 
Own rooms: tin 
-0.067*** -0.070*** -0.067*** 
-0.200*** -0.195*** -0.186*** 
Business 
wealth 
0.051*** 0.038*** 0.051*** 0.141*** 0.165*** 0.159*** 
Dummy: 
presence of 
Char 
0.017 -0.026*** 0.017 
-0.020*** -0.015* -0.170*** 
Having past 
savings 
-0.088*** -0.113*** -0.088*** 0.105*** 0.098*** 0.219* 
Presence of 
NGO 
-0.208** -0.126*** -0.208** -0.907*** -0.878*** -1.077*** 
Having VGD -0.189**   -0.220***   
Constant 1.062*** 1.139*** 1.062*** -0.005*** -0.006*** 0.011* 
 
 
Pseudo 
R2=.0987 
Pseudo 
R2=0.1001
Pseudo 
R2=0.1519
Pseudo 
R2=0.1667
Pseudo 
R2=0.1706 
Pseudo 
R2=0.1492
                   Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table-18 
Probit model - Old pensions  
 Moderate poor Extreme poor 
 All  Non 
participant 
participant All  Non 
participant 
participant 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Age of household head 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.009* -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.018***
Age square -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Family size 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.000 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.017
No. Of working male 
family members over 
12 years 
0.019*** 0.018*** 0.034 -0.121*** -0.121*** -0.110**
Homestead: own land 0.001* 0.001* -0.000 -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.019***
Cultivable: own land -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005
Dummy: day labor -0.114*** -0.115*** -0.083 -0.022 -0.019 -0.190
Dummy: agriculture -0.019* -0.021* 0.026 -0.097*** -0.089*** -0.246**
Dummy: non 
agriculture 
-0.197*** -0.194*** -0.196*** 0.252*** 0.245*** 0.366***
Dummy: day labor -0.017** -0.019*** 0.130*** 0.095*** 0.096*** -0.104*
Dummy: beggar 0.134*** 0.152*** 0.033 0.148*** 0.119*** 0.230**
Own rooms: tin -0.071*** -0.073*** -0.002 0.008 0.012** -0.130***
Business wealth 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.026 -0.201*** -0.204*** -0.132***
Dummy: presence of 
Char 
-0.016* -0.023*** 0.219*** 0.147*** 0.158*** -0.084
Having past savings -0.109*** -0.110*** -0.138*** -0.023*** -0.022*** 0.051
Presence of NGO -0.138*** -0.139*** -0.087 0.108*** 0.110*** -0.029
Having old pensions -.003* .089**  
Constant 1.169*** 1.165*** 0.199 -0.917*** -0.632*** 0.348
 Pseudo 
R2=0.09
88 
Pseudo 
R2=0.0997 
Pseudo 
R2=0.10
70
Pseudo 
R2=0.16
58
Pseudo 
R2=0.1630 
Pseudo 
R2=0.1867 
            Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table- 19 
Generalized Ordered Logit model 
 Extreme Poor Moderate Poor 
 coef coef 
Age of household head 0.009*** -0.011*** 
Square of age -0.000*** 0.000 
Family size -0.029*** -0.058*** 
No. of working male family 
members over 12 years 0.240*** 0.258*** 
Homestead: own land 0.023*** 0.016*** 
Cultivable: own land 0.011*** 0.016*** 
Dummy : monthly salaried 0.082 0.405*** 
Dummy : agriculture 0.244*** 0.223*** 
Dummy : non agriculture -0.496*** -0.044 
Dummy : day labor -0.224*** -0.277*** 
Dummy: beggar -0.264*** -0.693*** 
Own rooms: tin -0.020* 0.269*** 
Business wealth 0.421*** 0.338*** 
Presence of Char 0.553*** -0.251*** 
Having past savings 0.049*** 0.574*** 
Presence of NGO -0.180*** 0.652*** 
Having VGD card 0.543*** -0.177*** 
whether get old pension -0.157*** -0.098* 
_cons 0.535*** -6.736*** 
Pseudo R2       =      0.1975 
                                    Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
